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THE UNITED NATIONS CELESTIAL BODIES CONVENTION*
By PAUL G. DEMBLINGt AND DANIEL M. ARONStt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PROSPECT of manned lunar landings by both the United States
and the Soviet Union within a very few years has brought about the
realization that an international agreement providing for freedom of ex-
ploration of the moon and other celestial bodies is now a matter of prac-
tical necessity. Prior to the opening of the Fifth Session of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, agreement had been obtained on the fundamental principles
that (1) the exploration of the moon and celestial bodies should be con-
ducted for the benefit of all mankind, and (2) celestial bodies should be
free for scientific investigation without being subject to claims of sover-
eignty by individual nations.
It was not until the Spring of 1966, however, that a sense of urgency
developed among the nations involved in space exploration, which moved
the Legal Subcommittee to meet and press for agreement on a proposed
convention embodying these fundamental and collateral principles of
freedom of exploration. Accordingly, the drafts tabled by the Soviet Union
and the United States at the outset of the Fifth Session contained a re-
markable number of similarities. Shortly after the conclusion of tle siession,
agreement was obtained on all but a few of the provisions to be' ed
in the agreement.
This article describes and analyzes the draft conventions concerning
the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies considered by the
Legal Subcommittee at its Fifth Session held in Geneva between 12 July
and 4 August and in New York from 12 to 16 September, 1966.
II. ACTIVITY PRIOR To FIFTH SESSION
Even before 1960, a considerable amount of commentary existed on the
question of "whether it is possible for a terrestrial nation-state to acquire
sovereignty over all or part of a natural celestial body, and what would
* This article continues the chronological presentation of the work of the Legal Subcommittee
appearing in 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 329 (1966).
t Deputy General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A.B., M.A., Rutgers
University; J.D., The George Washington University. Member of the bar of the District of Co-
lumbia and Supreme Court of the United States.
tt Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., Georgetown University. Member of the
bar of the District of Columbia.
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be required under existing law to make such a claim legally valid."' An-
alogies were drawn to the manner in which nations had previously sought
to exert legal claims to sovereignty over portions of the earth's surface.'
Although writers regarded the legal principles derived from exploration
of the earth's surface as potentially applicable to exploration of celestial
bodies, they did not consider such applicability to be desirable.!
Prior to the proceedings of the Fifth Session, attention had been focused
upon the narrower problems associated with the launching of spacecraft,
their revolving in earth orbit, and their return to earth.' The proceedings
of the Fifth Session reflect a greatly increased concern with the need to
provide legal principles governing the peaceful exploration and use of
natural celestial bodies. It should be noted, however, that the Fifth Session
did not provide the first opportunity for intensive examination by the
United Nations of principles governing the exploration and use of celes-
tial bodies.! In 1961, at the first meeting of the present Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the na wion represented agreed on a draft
resolution which commended to the State for their guidance in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space the 11 ng principles:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national
appropriation.!
Further discussions in the Legal Subcommittee led to the unanimous adop-
tion of Resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
I Lipson and Katzenbach, Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the
Law of Outer Space, ABA FOUNDATION 22(a) (1960).
a Ibid. See also McDougal and Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 Am. J. INT'L
L. 407 (1958); Finch, Terrestrial Claims to Celestial Bodies, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEGAL PROB-
LEWS OF SPACE EXPLORATION, S. Doc. No. 26, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. at 626 (1961).
a For a discussion of the applicability of various principles and precedents to space exploration
see Brooks, National Control of Natural Planetary Bodies-Preliminary Considerations, 32 J. AIR
L. & Com. 315 (1966). For the history of the multiple claims to various portions of Antarctica,
as well as the assertions of national interests, see JEsSUP AND TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER
SPACE (1959); Lissitzyn, The American Position on Outer Space and Antarctica, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 126 (1959).
" Dembling and Arons, Space Law and the United Nations: The Work of the Legal Subcommittee
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 329
(1966).
' REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, U.N. Doc.
No. A 4141 at 25 (1959). For discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee, see Jessup and Taubenfeld,
The Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 877 (1959);
United Nations Establishes Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 40 DEP'T STATE BULL.
24 (1959); Aaronson, Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 227 THE TIMES
(London) 17 (weekly ed. 1959).
'U.N. GEN. Ass. RES. 1721 (XVI), 20 Dec. 1961. On the United States position, Ambassador
Stevenson made the following statement in General Assembly Committee I (Political and Security)
on 4 Dec. 1961:
Freedom of space and celestial bodies, like freedom of the seas, will serve the interest
of all nations.
Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in con-
formity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty or otherwise. 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 180, 181 (1962).
See also address by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, St. Louis University, 22 Oct. 1961, reproduced in 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 796, 800 (1961).
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Space, which reflects a certain international understanding of the principles
which ought to govern the exploration and use of outer space and celestial
bodies.' Thus, over two and one-half years before the Fifth Session, a
consensus had been obtained among the nations involved in space explora-
tion that celestial bodies should be governed by the principles of interna-
tional law and be free for peaceful exploration and use without being
subject to claims of national sovereignty.
III. ACTION GIVING RISE TO FIFTH SESSION
On 7 May 1966, President Johnson emphasized the need for immediate
action "to insure that explorations of the moon and other celestial bodies
will be for peaceful purposes only" and "to be sure that our astronauts
and those of other nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of
the moon."' The President suggested a treaty containing the following
elements:
The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and use
by all countries. No country should be permitted to advance a claim of
sovereignty.
There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries
should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies.
Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination.
Astronauts of one country should give any necessary help to astronauts
of another country.
No country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction
on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden.
Two days after the President made his suggestion, United States Am-
bassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, addressed a letter to
Kurt Waldheim of Austria, the Chairman of the Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space, requesting an early convening of the Legal Sub-
committee to consider the treaty proposed by President Johnson." On 30
May 1966, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko transmitted a letter from Mr.
A. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting the inclusion of an
item on the agenda for the Twenty-first Session of the General Assembly
entitled "Conclusion of an International Agreement on Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Conquest of the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."'" Mr. Gromyko's letter suggested that
such an international agreement be based on four principles, which appear
to be quite similar to those suggested by President Johnson."
'U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/L.331 and CORR. 1 (1963). For the full text, see 49 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 1012 (1963).
'For full text, see 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 900 (1966).
lid. at 900-01.
"U.N. Doc. No. A/6341 (1966).
' Mr. Gromyko stated his proposal as follows:
1. The moon and other celestial bodies should be open for exploration and use by
all States, without discrimination of any kind. All States enjoy freedom of scientific
research in regard to the moon and other celestial bodies on equal terms and in ac-
cordance with the fundamental principles of international law.
2. The moon and other celestial bodies should be used by all States exclusively for
1966]
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On 16 June Ambassador Goldberg addressed a letter to the Chairman
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space tabling the United
States' proposed draft "Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies." 1 That same day, Mr. Platon Morozov, Acting
Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R., transmitted to the Secretary-
General the Soviet proposed draft "Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies"13 for inclusion in the agenda of the Twenty-
first Session. Up to this point, the Soviets had desired that consideration
of these proposals await the start of the Twenty-first Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. However, in diplomatic discussions on 17 June, they re-
versed their position and even suggested that the Legal Subcommittee
convene prior to 12 July,' the date proposed by the United States. During
the following week, agreement was reached that 12 July would be the
date on which formal consideration would commence.
IV. GENEVA PORTION OF THE FIFTH SESSION
The Legal Subcommittee convened in Geneva to consider the two
proposals with all twenty-eight members represented. 5 Ambassador Gold-
berg headed the United States delegation, and Mr. Morozov led the Soviet
delegation. As introduced, the Titles, Preambles, and Articles I, II, and
III of both drafts are very similar. The similarities are most likely attribut-
able to the consensus that had been obtained previously as reflected in
General Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and 1962 (XVIII). Moreover,
both the Soviet and American draftsmen undoubtedly relied on Articles
I through IV of the Antarctic Treaty for substantive precedent, format,
and wording.
The preambles of both drafts contain general statements of purpose.
One particular point of difference is that the Soviet draft states that the
exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of
all peoples "irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific de-
peaceful purposes. No military bases or installations of any kind, including facilities
for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction of any type, should be established
on the moon or other celestial bodies.
3. The exploration and use of the moon and other celestial bodies shall be carried
on for the good and in the interest of all mankind; the moon and other celestial
bodies shall not be subject to appropriation or territorial claims of any kind.
4. In the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, States shall be guided
by the principles of cooperation and mutual aid and shall carry out their activities
with due regard for the relevant interests of other States and with a view to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
" U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/32 (1966). The text of the United States draft is reproduced in
Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of Its Fifth Session (12 July -4 Aug. and 12-16
Sept., 1966) to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/35,
Annex I at 6-9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Report of Legal Subcommittee]. See Appendix A herein.
"
3 U.N. Doc. No. A/6352 (1966). The text of the Soviet draft is reproduced in Annex I of
the Report of the Legal Subcommittee at 12-16. See Appendix B herein.
"
4 Washington Post, 18 June 1966, 5 A, p. 1, col. 7.
'a The twenty-eight members of the Legal Subcommittee are: Albania, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran,
Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Rumania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, United
Arab Republic, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States.
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velopment." The preamble to the United States draft does not contain
this allusion to underdeveloped or less developed countries. During the
Session, Brazil sought to amend Article I of the Soviet draft to include,
as a part of the binding treaty commitment, language to the effect that
the exploration and use of outer space shall be "for the benefit and in the
interests of all mankind irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development."1" The United Arab Republic sought to achieve the same end
by suggesting an entirely new paragraph 1 to Article I which would con-
tain the language proposed by Brazil and in addition provide that:
States engaged in the exploration of outer space undertake to accord
facilities and to provide possibilities to the non-space powers, to enable them
to participate in and to draw benefit from the exploration and the use of
outer space for the aim of deriving practical benefits related to their eco-
nomic and social development.'
The discrepancy is not major and can be deemed covered through interpre-
tation of the requirement that the exploration and use of outer space
be carried out "in the interests of all nations" or "for the benefit of all
mankind."
Articles I, II, and III of both drafts restate principles already unani-
mously adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 1962 (XVIII).
One point that provoked some discussion was the difference in coverage.
The Soviet draft covered both outer space and celestial bodies, while the
United States draft covered celestial bodies only. The United States then
revised and consolidated its Articles 2 and 3 to provide:
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage
international cooperation in such investigation."8
This revision was accepted by the Soviet Union and included as the
third paragraph of a corrected version of the Soviet Article I. Except for
the inclusion of "the moon and other celestial bodies" in paragraph 1, the
first two paragraphs of the corrected Soviet Article I remained essentially
the same as originally introduced." The principle contained in Article
II of the Soviet draft, prohibiting national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, is covered in Article 1 of the United States draft. Article 1
of the United States draft also covers the point made in Article III of
the Soviet draft that activities be undertaken in accordance with inter-
national law.
Article 4 of the United States draft would impose a mandatory obli-
gation upon a State conducting activities on a celestial body to report its
activities thereon to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to
make the findings of such activities freely available to the public inter-
national scientific community. The Soviet draft, as introduced, contained
16 Working Paper No. 5, 22 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 14; GE. 66-9960.
'7 Working Paper No. 8, 22 July 1966, Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 6.
'6Working Paper No. 1, 20 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 9, GE. 66-9835.
9 Working Paper No. 23/CoRR. 1, 29 July 1966, PUOS/66/Msc. 33/CORR. 1, GE. 66-10710.
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no comparable provision. However, the Soviet Union later proposed to
revise its draft to add the following provision:
A State conducting activities on celestial bodies will, on a voluntary
basis, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and also the
public and the international scientific community of the nature, conduct,
and locations of such activities."
The substantive difference between the United States and Soviet report-
ing provision is that the former is mandatory while the latter is voluntary.
The United Arab Republic apparently sought to achieve a compromise by
proposing a new, three-paragraph Article IV. The first paragraph essen-
tially embodies the Soviet proposal; but the second paragraph provides that
"All information shall be promptly submitted, preferably in advance or
at the carrying out of these activities or immediately thereafter." The
third paragraph provides for dissemination by the United Nations of
"said information which has to be ample and in detail for the benefit of
the general public and the international scientific community."" The
United Arab Republic proposal is rather ambiguous in adopting the Soviet
view that reporting should be merely voluntary, while appearing to make
some semantic concessions to the United States version. Perhaps its pro-
posal can most reasonably be interpreted as providing for voluntary re-
porting; but if the State concerned chooses to report, it must do so
promptly and in detail. The difference of opinion over whether reporting
should be made mandatory or voluntary was not resolved prior to ad-
journment on 4 August.2
Article 5 of the United States draft and Article IX of the Soviet draft
embody the principle of assistance to astronauts. The United States pro-
posal, as introduced, merely applies the principle to circumstances where
the astronauts requiring assistance are "engaged in activities on celestial
bodies." Read literally, the United States draft would apply only when,
for example, the astronauts needing aid are physically present on the
surface of the moon, although one might regard the provision applicable
where astronauts are in the atmosphere of a planet, not on the surface.
The Soviet version is broader and contains language taken from paragraph
9 of Resolution 1962 (XVIII), the Declaration of Legal Principles.
The United States later suggested two amendments to the Soviet Article
IX: the revision of the second sentence of the first paragraph to read
"When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the state of registry of their space vehicle"; and the addition
of a new paragraph to provide that "A State conducting activities in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall promptly
notify the United Nations Secretary-General of any information relating
to the physical safety of astronauts."2 The first amendment would add
the duty to "return" astronauts, as also provided for in paragraph 9 of
"oWorking Paper No. 4, 21 July 1966, Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex IIl at 3.
'1 Working Paper No. 7/CORR. 1, 27 July 1966. Id. at 5.
2 Washington Post, 5 Aug. 1966, § A, p. 16, col. 1.
'
3 Working Paper No. 12, 25 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 21.
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the Declaration of Legal Principles. The second amendment would add the
duty to notify the Secretary-General of hazards to the safety of astronauts.
The Soviet Union concurred in the need to provide for such a notification
provision; but rather than notify the Secretary-General, the Soviet Union
would amend Article IX of its draft to require Parties to the Treaty to
"inform the other Parties to the Treaty of any facts they establish in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which consti-
tute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.""
As noted previously, draft treaties covering assistance to and return
of astronauts and space vehicles have received detailed consideration in
prior sessions of the Legal Subcommittee and agreement virtually reached
on a detailed convention. Should the principle of assistance to astronauts
in outer space and on celestial bodies be included as a provision in the
celestial bodies convention, the need for a separate convention on assist-
ance and return might disappear. With this in mind, the Indian delegation
proposed an additional amendment to Article IX of the Soviet draft pro-
viding that "This Article is subject to the provisions of a separate agree-
ment to be concluded dealing with assistance to and return of astronauts
and space vehicles."' The desirability of further consideration of the de-
tailed convention on assistance and return will require further discussion.
As introduced, Article 6 of the United States draft would require "all
areas of celestial bodies, including all stations, installations, equipment
and space vehicles on celestial bodies" to be "open at all times to repre-
sentatives of other nations conducting activities on celestial bodies." The
Soviet draft contained an analogous provision in Article I, paragraph 2.
However, the Soviet version only mentioned "regions," without listing
"stations, installations," etc. The question arose as to whether the Soviet
draft would afford open access to the items listed in the United States
version. The Soviets then offered to amend Article I to add a new para-
graph providing for access to "stations, installations," etc., but "on a basis
of reciprocity and subject to agreement between the parties with regard to
the time of visit to such objects."' The United States then revised its
Article 6 to delete the word "areas." 2 At adjournment, therefore, Article I
of the Soviet draft would provide for "free access to all regions of celestial
bodies," but access might be limited with respect to "stations, installations,
equipment, and space vehicles" on celestial bodies. The United States con-
tinued to adhere to the mandatory provision for open access to "stations,
installations," etc.
Little difficulty was encountered with respect to Article 7 of the United
States draft and Article V of the Soviet draft providing for jurisdiction
and control of space vehicles and persons. Once again, the United States
draftsmen limited coverage to activities on celestial bodies, while the
Soviet draftsmen included coverage pertaining to activities in outer space
24 Working Paper No. 24, 28 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 34, GE. 66-10609.
'6Working Paper No. 22, 28 July 1966, Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex II at 11.
" Working Paper No. 2, 20 July 1966, PUOS/66/Msc. 12, GE. 66-9897.
27 Working Paper No. 3, 21 July 1966, Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 2.
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as well as on celestial bodies. The language of the Soviet version is identical
to paragraph 7 of the Declaration of Legal Principles except for the addi-
tion of "celestial bodies." The text of Article V of the Soviet draft, with
a few grammatical changes, was accepted by the Working Group at its
first meeting on 27 July 1966.8
Articles 8 and 9 of the United States draft, taken together, are quite
similar to Article X of the Soviet draft. Both versions would forbid the
stationing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on or near
celestial bodies and would require that the moon and other celestial bodies
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Again, the United States ver-
sion would apply to activities on celestial bodies (and, in this case, "near"
a celestial body), while the Soviet version would apply to outer space
as well. However, the last two sentences of Article IV of the Soviet draft,
pertaining to "peaceful purposes," are limited in application to celestial
bodies. The language of both the United States and Soviet versions is based
upon General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII)Y" Another precedent
is Article 1 of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing
of nuclear weapons in outer space and, by 'implication, on celestial bodies.
On 22 July both the United States and Soviet delegations offered amend-
ments to render their drafts prohibiting military activities more compatible.
The United States proposed to revise Articles 8 and 9 to include a pro-
vision almost identical to the first sentence of Article IV of the Soviet
draft.' Article 8, as introduced, would be deleted. At the same time, the
Soviet Union proposed to revise Article IV of its draft to add a new last
sentence providing that "The use of military personnel for scientific
experiments or any other peaceful use shall not be forbidden." 1 This would
comport, in part, with the last sentence of the revised United States ver-
sion which provides: "The use of military personnel and equipment for
scientific research or any other peaceful purpose shall not be prohibited."
While agreement had almost been obtained oan this provision, a difference
still remained at the conclusion of the Geheva portion of the Session, con-
cerning whether military equipment may be used for scientific research or
other peaceful purposes."
Article 10 of the United States draft and Article VIII of the Soviet
'
8 WG./L.1, 28 July 1966. See note 51, infra. The Working Group met from 27 July to 3
August, 1966. On the appointment of this Group see Interim Report by the Chairman of the Legal
Subcommittee, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/L.16 (1966).
"'U.N. GEN. Ass. RES. 1884 (XVIII), 17 Oct. 1963.
. . . [S]olemnly calls upon all States;
(a) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons
on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner;
(b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the con-
duct of the foregoing activities.
"Working Paper No. 6, 22 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 15, GE. 66-9969. Articles 8 and 9 of
the United States draft were further revised by Working Paper No. 6/Rev. 1, 1 Aug. 1966, in
Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 4.
aWorking Paper No. 9, 22 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 18, GE. 66-10005. The last word in
the amended Art. IV, "forbidden," was changed to "prohibited," in Working Paper No. 9/CORR.
1, 26 July 1966, in Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 7.
"Washington Evening Star, 9 Aug. 1966, S A, p. 2, col. 5. See Langer, Disarmament on the
Moon: The Prospects Look Good, Science, 8 July 1966, p. 153.
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draft would require States to conduct their activities in such a manner as
to "avoid harmful contamination" of celestial bodies. The Soviet draft
would also apply to "outer space," and the United States draft would re-
quire States to prevent "adverse changes in the environment of Earth re-
sulting from the return of extra-terrestrial matter." Except for the addition
of references to "celestial bodies," the Soviet version is almost identical to
paragraph 6 of the Declaration of Legal Principles. On 26 July the Soviet
Union proposed a revision to its Article VIII which would substitute for
the second sentence the entire Article 10 of the United States draft."
By the same revision, the Soviet Union appears to have accepted certain
technical amendments suggested by the United States which would make
it clear that the requirements of the Soviet Article VIII apply to activities
on the moon, on other celestial bodies, and in outer space."
Article 2 of the United States draft and Article X of the Soviet draft
provide for settlement of disputes. The United States draft would pro-
vide for voluntary referral of disputes by any Contracting Party to the
International Court of Justice. The Soviet draft would provide for con-
sultation by the parties to the dispute but does not mention resort to the
International Court of Justice as a possible mode of settlement.
The Soviet draft contains provisions covering two matters absent from
the United States draft, as introduced. Article VI of the Soviet draft pro-
vides for international responsibility by Parties to the treaty for national
activities in outer space or on celestial bodies regardless of whether the
activities are carried out by government agencies or private entities. The
last sentence seeks to hold an international organization and the Parties
to the Treaty who participate in such organization responsible for activi-
ties in outer space undertaken by the organization. The language of this
Article is taken almost entirely from paragraph 5 of the Declaration of
Legal Principles." As a statement of a treaty obligation, the last sentence
is faulty in not providing for the manner in which international organi-
zations that conduct activities in outer space and on celestial bodies may
become Parties to the Treaty. To remedy this defect, the United Kingdom
suggested that a separate article on International Organizations should be
included. The first paragraph would provide that:
If an international organization which conducts activities in outer space
including the moon and celestial bodies transmits to . . . [the depository
authority] a declaration that it accepts and undertakes to comply with the
provisions of this treaty, all provisions except Articles [here insert a reference
to the Articles concerning signature, ratification and accession by States],
shall apply to the organization as they apply to a State which is a party to
this treaty.
"
3 Working Paper No. 2, 26 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 30, GE. 66-10329.
' The United States proposed amendments to Art. VIII of the Soviet draft are in Working
Paper No. 18, 26 July 1966, PUOS/66/Mlsc. 28, GE. 66-10284. Japan had previously proposed an
alternative formulation to Art. 10 of the United States draft in Working Paper No. 10, 25 July
1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 19, GE. 66-10117, which would have added the duty to exercise maximum
care for preservation and conservation of natural resources and environment of celestial bodies.
" The United States suggested certain technical amendments to Art. VI of the Soviet draft in
Working Paper No. 14, 25 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 23, GE. 66-10132.
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Paragraph 2 would require Parties to the Treaty, who are members of an
international organization that conducts space activities, to use their best
efforts to obtain such a declaration. Paragraph 3 would provide that until
such a declaration is filed, Parties to the Treaty, who are members of an
international organization that conducts space activities, take steps to
assure that the international organization concerned acts in accordance
with the treaty."
Article VII of the Soviet draft, as introduced, would provide for the
"international" liability of Parties to the Treaty which launch or "orga-
nize" the launching of objects into outer space "and on to celestial bodies."
The subject of liability is extremely complex and draft conventions cover-
ing the subject have been considered in detail during previous sessions."
Except for the addition of the phrase "on to celestial bodies," the Soviet
draft is almost identical to paragraph 8 of the Declaration of Legal Prin-
ciples. The head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Goldberg,
stated with respect to the subject of "liability" that "our draft treaty
does not deal with it, in part because of our feeling that its complexity
makes it an appropriate subject for a separate agreement. ' However, it
became apparent that the United States would accept the essentials of the
Soviet provision on liability when the United States suggested certain
technical amendments to Article VII of the Soviet draft." In addition,
India proposed to substitute the word "absolutely" for "internationally,"
arid, similar to its suggestion made in connection with the "assistance and
return" article, proposed to add a new paragraph providing that "The
principle embodied in this Article is subject to detailed provisions dealing
with the various aspects of this principle to be included in a separate agree-
ment on liability in case of damage."' ° The U.S.S.R. agreed to the redraft
proposed by the United States, and on 28 July, the Working Group
accepted an article on "liability."'
During the course of the session, coverage of two new substantive
matters was suggested. The United Arab Republic proposed a new article
which would provide for regulation, on the world-wide level, of commu-
nications satellites used for direct broadcasting. States would be urged to
utilize such satellites to promote "friendly relations" and "in accordance
with the resolutions of the General Assembly which condemn using the
media of information for hostile propaganda."" The Soviet Union pro-
posed that an article be added to its draft which would require parties
to the treaty to accord each other "equal conditions for observing the
flight of space objects launched by those States,"'3 that is, cooperative use
of tracking facilities.
The remaining provisions in the United States and Soviet drafts pro-
' Working Paper No. 17, 25 July 1966, in Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 8.
" See Dernbling and Arons, supra note 4 at 349-56.
"Bus. Week, 23 July 1966, p. 70.
"' Working Paper No. 16/Rev. 1, 26 July 1966, PUOS/66/Misc. 26 REv. 1, GE. 66-10256.
40 Working Paper No. 21, 28 July 1966, Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex III at 10.
41 WG./L.2, 28 July 1966.
"Working Paper No. 19, 26 July 1966. Id. at 9.
'Working Paper No. 23/Costa. 1, 29 July 1966. Id. at 12.
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vide for signature, ratification, entry into force, amendment, withdrawal,
notification, and registration. Several differences are noteworthy. Article
12 of the United States draft provides that the Agreement shall be open
for signature to members of the United Nations, or any of its specialized
agencies, or to parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
or any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a party.
Article XI, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft would provide that "This
treaty shall be open to all States for signature," including presumably
East Germany and Communist China. Article 13 of the United States
draft and Article XI,- paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft differ only insofar
as the United States draft would require instruments of ratification to be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, while the
Soviet draft would provide for deposit with designated depositary govern-
ments. Article 14 of the United States draft and Article XI, paragraphs 3
and 4, of the Soviet draft cover entry into force. The Soviet draft states
that "This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification," presumably
meaning that all of the original signatories must ratify before the Treaty
enters into force. The United States draft would provide that "This
Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of the second instrument
of ratification, approval, or accession." The matters of amendment and
withdrawal from the Agreement, covered in Articles 15 and 16 of the
United States draft, respectively, are omitted in the Soviet draft. Article
17 of the United States draft and Article XI, paragraph 5, of the Soviet
draft, covering notification of all Parties of signatures, deposits of instru-
ments of ratification, etc., parallel the provisions for ratification, etc. The
United States would impose the duty to notify upon the Secretary-General
of the United Nations; the Soviet Union would impose this duty upon
the depositary governments. Both Article 18 of the United States draft and
Article XI of the Soviet draft provide that registration shall be in accord-
ance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
When the Geneva portion of the session was adjourned on 4 August
1966, agreement had been obtained in the Working Group on the texts
of nine articles.' Three of these articles reflect the general principles gov-
erning exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies contained
in Articles 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the United States draft and Articles I, II, and
III of the Soviet draft, as introduced and considered during the Session.
The first of these three articles adopted by the Working Group stands for
the propositions that:
(1) the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies shall be
for the benefit of all mankind;
(2) there shall be freedom of exploration and use of outer space and
celestial bodies by all states on a basis of equality;
(3) there shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,
including celestial bodies, and to that end international cooperation should
be facilitated; and
"The nine articles are set forth in Annex II to the Report of the Legal Subcommittee.
1966]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32
(4) there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies."
The second of the three articles bars claims of sovereignty and national
appropriation from outer space and celestial bodies.' Thirdly, the parties
to the treaty would be committed to conduct activities in outer space and
on celestial bodies in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations."'
The other six articles agreed upon cover a variety of substantive issues
and serve to demonstrate the surprisingly high level of mutual understand-
ing that existed during the Geneva portion of the Fifth Session. Agree-
ment was reached on a provision covering assistance to and return of
astronauts in distress, as reflected in Article 5 of the United States draft
and Article IX of the Soviet draft."' Agreement was attained on a provision
covering liability, as reflected in Article VII of the Soviet draft, to which
the United States adhered subject to a few minor changes in wording.
Agreement was achieved on an article which would obligate parties to the
treaty to take steps to avoid the harmful contamination of outer space and
4 The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries irrespective
of their degree of economic or scientific development and shall be the province of all
mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for cx-
ploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to
all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-
operation in such investigation.
Text of Art. I accepted by the Working Group at its third meeting on 29 July 1966; WG./L.3,
in Report of the Legal Subcommittee, Annex II at 4.
s "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Text
of article accepted by the Working Group at its sixth meeting on 2 Aug. 1966; WG./L.7. Id. at 8.
47 The Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international
law, including the charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining inter-
national peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its sixth meeting on 2 Aug. 1966; WG./L.8. Id.
at 9.
48 States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer
space, and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress,
or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas.
When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to
the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of
one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States
Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other Parties to the Treaty
or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a
danger to the life or health of astronauts.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its fourth meeting on 1 Aug. 1966; WG./L.T
and CoRn. 1. Id. at 6.
49 Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object
into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party
from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by
such objects or its component parts on the Earth, in air space, or in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its second meeting on 28 July 1966; WG./L.2.
Id. at 3.
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celestial bodies."0 Although the text of this article was taken almost en-
tirely from Article VIII of the Soviet draft, the same principle was em-
bodied in Article 10 of the United States draft.
Agreement was reached on a provision requiring retention of ownership
by the launching state of objects launched into outer space, and the return
of such objects, as reflected in Article 7 of the United States draft and
Article V of the Soviet draft.'" Agreement was reached on the text of an
article which would prohibit the parties from placing weapons of mass
destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies, and that the moon and
other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. How-
ever, it was made clear that no agreement had as yet been reached on
whether a prohibition on the establishment of military installations should
be expressly included in the article and whether military equipment may
be used for scientific research or other peaceful purposes."5 Finally, as pro-
posed by Article VI of the Soviet draft, agreement was achieved on an
article which would require the parties to the treaty to bear international
50 In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests
of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue
studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies and conduct ex-
ploration of them, so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes
in the environment of the earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a
State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned
by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding
with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason
to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the ac-
tivity or experiment.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its second meeting 28 July 1966; WG./L.2. Id.
at 3.
st A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched
into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of
their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial
body or by their return to earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the
limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be
returned to that State, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to
their return.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its first meeting on 27 July 1966; WG./L.1
and CORR. 1. Id. at 2.
52 The Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any ob-
jects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
by all Parties to the Treaty. The establishment of military bases [installations] and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel [and
equipment] for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its third meeting on 29 July 1966; WG./L.4.
Id. at 5. (The words in brackets have not been agreed upon.)
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responsibility for national activities in outer space and on celestial bodies.'
Aside from differences in the provisions concerning procedures (i.e.,
settlement of disputes, signature, ratification, etc.), only five substantive
differences appeared to remain at the conclusion of the Geneva portion of
the Fifth Session:(1) whether the reporting of activities on celestial bodies should be
mandatory or voluntary;
(2) whether there should be free access "at all times" to stations, equip-
ment, and space vehicles on celestial bodies;
(3) whether military equipment may be used for space exploration;
(4) whether there should be a provision requiring the cooperative use
of tracking facilities; and
(5) whether the United Kingdom proposal on international organiza-
tions should be adopted."
V. NEw YORK PORTION OF THE FIFTH SESSION
After a hiatus of five and one-half weeks, the Fifth Session of the Legal
Subcommittee reconvened on 12 September 1966, at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York City to attempt to resolve the remaining issues.
Draft proposals by the Soviet Union and the United States on articles not
yet agreed upon were submitted to a working group of the entire Sub-
committee.
The first proposal submitted by the United States concerned open access
to installations on celestial bodies. Article 6, as originally proposed by the
United States, called for access to installations "at all times." Inasmuch
as the Soviet delegation indicated that it was unable to accept Article 6,
the United States had revised it in accordance with suggestions made by
Japan and Italy. The new proposal omitted the phrase "at all times" and
required that States should give "reasonable advance notice of a projected
visit." Such visits would be "on a basis of reciprocity."a During debate, the
Soviet Union proposed that the timing of visits should be a matter for
negotiation. This, however, was opposed by the United States because it
seemed to carry an implication of a veto on a particular visit. The formula
proposed by the United States partially satisfies Soviet wishes by providing
that when advanced notice of a projected visit is served "appropriate con-
U The Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activitis
in outer space including the moon, and other celestial bodies, whether such activities
are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set
forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and
continuing supervision by the State concerned. When activities are carried on in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization,
responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international
organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
Text of article accepted by the Working Group at its fourth meeting on 1 Aug. 1966; WG./L. 6.
Id. at 7.
" Texts proposed by various delegations on these matters are contained in the Report of the
Legal Subcommittee, Annex III.
" Working Paper No. 30, 12 Sept. 1966, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, A/6431 (1966). See also U.N. Press Release WS/259, 16 Sept. 1966 at p. 4.
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sultations" may be held and maximum precautions taken to avoid inter-
ference with the normal operations of the space installation to be visited.
The reference to noninterference was included to overcome the Soviet's
argument that unannouncd visits could be harmful to the installation and
hazardous to safety.
The second United States proposal concerned the reporting of activi-
ties on a celestial body. The United States offered a revision of its Article
4 under which States parties to the convention would be bound "to the
extent feasible and practicable" to submit reports either to the other parties
to the convention or to the Secretary-General." It was felt that this revised
version of the Article would meet the objections of the Soviet Union.
Some of the representatives felt that these changes were too far-reaching,
and the United Arab Republic stated that reports should be made to the
Secretary-General who should disseminate them immediately. The United
States was prepared to accept such a proposal.57
The Soviet Union also suggested some key changes in its proposals. One
of these would alter the wording of an article that would cover the track-
ing facilities to be provided for observing the flight of space objects. The
Soviet Union has insisted that States granting tracking facilities to any
space power shall provide the same facilities, on the same terms, to other
powers. However, this obligation was unacceptable to many members of
the Subcommittee and was supported by only a small number of East
European States. The new Soviet version retains the provision on equal
terms but adds a new provision that expenses incurred in rendering track-
ing help will be paid.'
The position taken by the United States was that tracking facilities are
a matter for bilateral negotiations and agreement. Ambassador Goldberg
stated during the meetings of the Subcommittee" that the United States
has held such discussions and has reached agreements with a number of
countries on a basis of mutual commitment and common advantage. The
European Space Research Organization and France have also established
wide-spread tracking networks on a similar basis. In an effort to resolve
the impasse, Ambassador Goldberg later stated
[I] f the U.S.S.R. desires to provide for tracking coverage from United States
territory, we, for our part, are prepared to discuss with Soviet representatives
the technical and other requirements involved with a view to reaching some
mutually beneficial agreement. Our scientists and technical representatives
can meet without delay to explore the possibilities."
As Ambassador Goldberg pointed out in his opening statement before
the Twenty-First General Assembly on 22 September
Major progress has been made in the negotiation of this important treaty but
5SWorking Paper No. 31, 13 Sept. 1966, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, A/6431 (1966).
37 Summary Record of the Seventy-Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1O5/C.2/SR.73 (1966).
"Working Paper No. 29, 13 Sept. 1966, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, A/6431 (1966).
59Summary Record of the Seventy-Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.lO$/C.2/SR.73 (1966).
"ON. Y. Times, 23 Sept. 1966, p. 12, col. 2.
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several issues remain. One of these concerns the question of reporting by space
powers of their activities on celestial bodies. A second issue concerns access
by space powers to one another's installations on celestial bodies.61
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears that the major work on the convention has been done. Im-
portant provisions, including obligations in the area of arms control, have
been agreed upon. It remains now for the outstanding issues to be resolved
so that the General Assembly may approve a completed convention before
its adjournment.
61 Ibid.
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